How we will promote aid and budget transparency in Busan

prepared by Paolo de Renzio, Senior Research Fellow at the International Budget Partnership

Open Budget Surveys have repeatedly found that countries that are heavily dependent on foreign aid to finance their budgets tend to have less transparent budget processes, . This might be due to various country characteristics, such as low incomes or weak democratic institutions. But donor behaviour also plays a part, as argued in a recent IBP Briefing Note. The brief highlights the importance of the relationship between donors’ provision of information on aid flows and recipient country governments’ disclosure of budget information to their citizens. In fact, aid transparency and budget transparency are inextricably linked. Budgets in partner countries cannot be made fully transparent without improved aid transparency. Only if donors provide partner countries with sufficient information, compatible with partner country budget systems and schedules, can timely, accurate and comprehensive budget information be made available to citizens of countries receiving aid. This point is also highlighted in the the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Budget Transparency, Accountability and Participation, signed last week by nearly 100 civil society groups.

At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which will take place in a few days in Busan, South Korea, the transparency theme will have a prominent place. The latest draft of the Busan Outcome Document (the declaration that participating governments will sign at the end of the Forum) covers transparency issues in a number of ways. First, transparency and accountability are recognized as ‘shared principles’ that form the foundation of development cooperation, alongside ownership, results and inclusive partnerships. Second, a whole paragraph (para 22) is devoted to aid transparency commitments, in which donor agencies undertake to make publicly available more information on aid flows, and to implement a common standard for its publication, building among other things on the efforts of the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Third, donors and recipient countries commit to building more transparent public financial management systems and to improving fiscal transparency.

All of these commitments were the outcome of some difficult negotiations, facing resistance from a number of donor governments, including China, Japan and France. Provided they make it through the final discussions, they are very welcome, and represent a significant step forward in recognizing the importance of transparency and accountability as key ingredients of both aid and development effectiveness. The explicit link between aid transparency and budget transparency, however, is not recognized. Luckily, this link will be the focus of a plenary session, which IBP has helped organize and which is supported by a smaller number of like-minded actors, including the governments of Sweden, the US, Rwanda and South Africa, the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), the World Bank and CSOs like Transparency International and Publish What You Fund. In this session, more ambitious targets and commitments around aid and budget transparency will be discussed, and hopefully agreed.

One of the most important aspects of the discussions at Busan will be to agree on the future international architecture for development cooperation, with a view to overcome the limitations of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which for too long has been seen as too exclusive a body that does not reflect the role of emerging donors and the need for a more equal partnership between donor and recipient governments. The current draft of the Busan Outcome Document talks about the establishment of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Ideally, this body should include a specific mechanism for ensuring the transparency-related commitments are monitored and enforced. Such mechanism would also gain from a multi-stakeholder nature, following the example of the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT), which brings together governments, international organizations and civil society groups in a joint effort to promote fiscal transparency across the world.

The International Budget Partnership will be represented at the Busan Forum, and will report back on what happened.

Watch this space!

Health aid fighting wars, not AIDS?

It is every donor’s nightmare that recipient governments end up spending aid on things that it was not intended for. The fashionable budget support approach gives up on this nightmare by leaving allocative decisions to recipients and rather concentrating on  strengthening the country institutions that make these decisions. But this does not mean that donors stop worrying about all of this.

new study in the Lancet finds that ”DAH to government had a negative and significant effect on domestic government spending on health such that for every US$1 of DAH to government, government health expenditures from domestic resources were reduced by $0·43 (p=0) to $1·14 (p=0).”

In English this means:  When poor countries get money for health spending, this does not increase overall levels of health spending because governments reduce their own spending on health in response. The Lancet study finds that for every dollar donors give to governments to spend on health, governments reduce their own spending on health by between $0.43–1.17. This means that in the most extreme cases governments would reduce their own contribution by even more than the amount that they get from donors.

Such reallocation of health funding is viewed very badly by most donors. The assumption in that such funding is being spent on bad things like tanks, expensive hotels and jewelery.  But in a commentary to the article, three other reasons for such behavior is presented:

  • Governments may compensate for exceptional international generosity to the health sector by reallocating government funding to other sectors;
  • Governments may be anticipating long-term unreliability of international health aid by stalling possible increases of recurrent health expenditure; or
  • Governments may be ‘smoothing’ aid by spreading aid across several years.

The commentary concludes very nicely that while: “crowding out is a real and widespread occurrence, it does not happen in all countries for which international aid for health increases. In countries in which it does take place, it seems to be the result of deliberate policy choices, which have to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.”

Two things seem clear:

  • Generalizing about the fungibility of aid is perilous. It assumes evil, opportunistic governments in poor countries and ignores the possibility of these decisions being rational and even (incredibly!) developmental.
  • In the long run aid conditionality is an exercise in futility. The only way to ensure allocative efficiency is to increase domestic oversight of the people and institutions that make allocative decisions.

PS. There are also some methodological problems with the Lancet study raised by David Roodman of the CDG. Click here to read more.

Paying for Climate Change: “How” Is as Important as “How Much”

This post was prepared by Athena Ballesteros of the World Resources Institute, and Vivek Ramkumar  of the International Budget Partnership.

Adaptation, mitigation, conservation, new technologies—when it comes to addressing the impacts of climate change and moving to a low-carbon economy, the costs will be shared and significant. As 190 countries met in Copenhagen over the last two weeks to negotiate the next global agreement on climate change, they were confronted by the question of “how much?” but also “how?”

While much of the energy so far has focused on securing contribution commitments from countries, it is critical how these commitments are managed. To get this right, resources and management must be considered simultaneously.

Regardless of how the funds are generated (private investment, bilateral and multilateral contributions, market-based carbon markets, or national budget allocations), a significant share will flow to developing countries that, because of entrenched poverty and threatened and degraded environments, are most vulnerable and less able to respond to climate change impacts.

Any consensus on finance that emerges from Copenhagen must address how to help these countries build resilience and the capacity to respond to climate change, and how to create finance architecture that is seen as legitimate; can mobilize new, additional, and predictable sources of funds; and is transparent and accountable.

A new global deal on climate finance will likely redistribute power, responsibility, and accountability significantly between traditional contributor and recipient countries, including a fair and balanced representation of developed (primarily contributor) and developing (primarily recipient) countries. This redistribution is both long overdue and necessary to ensure the national and local “ownership”—and thus effectiveness—of mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries.

Given the potential impacts of climate change on their economic development and the lives and livelihoods of their people, governments receiving climate mitigation/adaptation funds must manage these effectively. Responding to climate change will require governments to make fundamental shifts and choices on how to grow economically and how to identify and address significant environmental and social risks that might arise. Involving civil society organizations (CSOs) and the public in these decisions can strengthen policy choices, increase buy in, and, ultimately, improve outcomes.

However, for this public engagement to be meaningful, governments must provide comprehensive and useful information and opportunities to participate. In designing a climate change finance mechanism, the parties in Copenhagen must consider ways to place appropriate pressure on recipient countries to be more open and accountable.

First, any new global climate change finance institution should incorporate practices and procedures into its operations that ensure that its finance flows are transparent, thus promoting accountability at both the international and country level.

For instance, donors often channel aid through mechanisms that are outside a recipient government’s formal budget system, and which follow separate and parallel budget and reporting procedures. Such off-budget funding is justified by concerns that existing government budget management institutions and practices may be weak.

While donors should be concerned about the proper use of their aid monies, they also need to assess the long-term impact of off-budget funding.  Off-budget financing places strains on public finance systems, inhibits effectively integrating aid funds into the regular policy- and budget-making cycle, and undermines the capacity of civil society to engage in oversight.

A global climate finance mechanism should be designed to channel funds whenever possible through government budget systems.  When this is not possible, efforts should be made to ensure that the systems and procedures for funded projects and programs are as compatible as possible with those of recipient government budget systems.

In addition to making sure its own practices are transparent, a climate change finance mechanism could place appropriate pressure on recipient countries to make information publicly available. For example, a clause could be included in financing agreements that all information on the amount and use of these resources that the recipient government provides to the finance mechanism be considered publicly available.

In countries where the main obstacle to increased transparency is a lack of technical capacity or adequate systems for producing and disseminating information, a climate finance institution could play an important role. For example, it could support the introduction of comprehensive information systems to enhance the ability to produce accurate and timely information, and the creation of information disclosure systems. Such systems would allow governments to proactively make public information on the use of these public resources.

It will also be important to recognize that managing climate change funds will be influenced not just by the overall level of transparency but also by the wider accountability environment. This includes oversight institutions with an official mandate to monitor the work of the executive, as well as a civil society and media that is able to use available information to hold governments to account for the use of climate resources. There is growing evidence that these actors can improve the overall quality of accountability and support the functioning of formal oversight institutions.

Therefore, support for strengthening recipient countries’ systems of checks and balances for how public funds are used, including strengthening the role and powers of legislatures and auditors, could be an important contribution to efforts to use climate change resources effectively.

Transparency and accountability are key challenges in negotiating the design of a future climate finance mechanism. If done properly, shifting power and responsibility to developing countries, through greater voice in decision-making, will entail greater responsibility for the outcomes of investments. Combining this with a climate change finance architecture that promotes transparent, participatory, and accountable national and international systems for decision making, measuring, reporting, and verifying funded actions may lead to stronger and deeper partnership between contributors and recipients and, ultimately, to more effective and sustainable efforts to combat climate change.


Global Health: What would Barack do?

As the American Presidential campaign heats up, it is good to see that candidates’ views on the US’s global health agenda is also getting some column space.

Unsurprisingly global health is nowhere near as prominent in the McCain campaign as it is for Obama. Apart from supporting PEPFAR, McCain has been vague on other global health issues.

In a recent CGD Policy Brief, health economist Ruth Levine sets out a systematic to-do list for Obama. Some of her key points are:

  • Work more closely with UN and other multilateral partners
  • Live up to your funding commitments, also smaller ones like those for malaria and child health
  • Make decisions based on scientific evidence, not political or narrow moral preferences
  • Find  a balance between AIDS and non-AIDS health spending (click here for more on this debate)
  • Establish exchange programs for training and research.

Obama’s campaign documents have made extensive commitments around expanding PEPFAR; taking on drug and insurance companies and supporting the Global fund and the MDGs. He has also made promises about adressing health infrastructure and the migration of health workers.

True to form, though, these campaign promises don’t explain how all these promises will be paid for or how  the strong interests that litter the health sector in the US and the rest of the world will be navigated. While Obama may attach more importance to questions of global  health, it only merits one paragraph in his 64 page ‘Blueprint for Change‘. It seems fairly clear therefore that he would only be able to move as far and as quickly on global health as his domestic constituency will let him.

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Getting serious about Budget Support

Budget support is meant to build democratic accountability for public funds and reduce the amount of red tape involved with donor transactions.

The challenge of budget support is to change the relationship between donors and recipient government as well as between governments and their citizens.

If this is not done, budget support is doomed to be no more than project support by a new name.

Recent research by the International Budget Partnership and Eurodad shows that there is a lot more that donors can do to make Budget Support succeed. They argue that:

  • Donors frustrate the objective of budget support by imposing policy conditions and performance targets.
  • Democratic accountability be an automatic result of budget support – it has to be built.
  • Donor don’t do enough to build democratic accountability.
  • Donors still have better and earlier access to budget information than citizens.
  • Donors participate in the budget process earlier than citizens and their representatives.
  • By the time citizens and legislatures enter the budget process, donor agreements have large been finalized.

Read the full document here in English, Espagnol ou Francais.

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